Contemporary protectionist policies in the U.S. are often initiated by the executive branch but enforced unevenly across firms. We argue that such uneven enforcement arises because legislators—with both institutional capacity and local motivation—shield connected firms from executive protectionist measures. We test this claim using the Trump administration’s Buy American Act (BAA), which penalized firms reliant on foreign, especially Chinese, suppliers. Combining firm-level data on federal contracts, supply chains, and campaign contributions, we analyze 1,958 firms (2015–2019).

Measuring regime support in closed autocracies is notoriously challenging due to preference falsification, state censorship, and pervasive propaganda. We introduce a novel behavioral measure of regime loyalty based on subtle expressions of allegiance in soldier obituaries published in Nazi Germany between 1939 and 1945. Our empirical analysis draws on a large-scale dataset of over one million scanned pages from roughly 160,000 newspaper issues across 260 unique local news outlets.