Do attackers have a legal duty of care? Limits to the ‘individualization of war’

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Does International Humanitarian Law (IHL) impose a duty of care on the attacker? From a moral point of view, should it? This article argues that the legal situation is contestable, and the moral value of a legal duty of care in attack is ambivalent. This is because a duty of care is both a condition for and an obstacle to the ‘individualization of war’. The individualization of war denotes an observable multi-dimensional norm shift in international relations.

Brexit and the Politics of Housing in Britain

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Political earthquakes—both real and perceived—are trembling through Britain. In the 2015 general election, the Scottish National party and the UK Independence party mounted successful challenges from the periphery. In the 2016 referendum on EU membership, the Vote Leave campaign captured a surprising number of votes from both sides of the traditional political divide.

AI, China, Russia, and the global order: technological, political, global, and creative perspectives

Submitted by joby.mullens on

Artificial Intelligence and big data promise to help reshape the global order. For decades, most political observers believed that liberal democracy offered the only plausible future pathways for big, industrially sophisticated countries to make their citizens rich.

Private Sector Cyber Weapons: An Adequate Response to the Sovereignty Gap?

Submitted by joby.mullens on

Lucas Kello's book chapter titled "Private Sector Cyber Weapons: An Adequate Response to the Sovereignty Gap?" has been published in Herbert Lin and Amy Zegart, Bytes, Bombs, and Spies: The Strategic Dimensions of Offensive Cyber Operations (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2019).

Intelligibility, Moral Loss and Injustice

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In Liberalism's Religion, I analyse the specific conception of religion that liberalism relies upon. I argue that the concept of religion should be disaggregated into its normatively salient features. When deciding whether to avert undue impingements on religious observances, or to avoid any untoward support of such observances, liberal states should not deal with ‘religion’ as such but, rather, with relevant dimensions of religious phenomena. States should avoid religious entanglement when ‘religion’ is epistemically inaccessible, socially divisive and/or comprehensive in scope.

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