'Cooperation, Conflict, and the Costs of Anarchy'

I consider a model in which two states choose how much to arm and whether to attack in successive periods. Arms are useful not only for deterrence or taking territory, but also because they influence the resolution of a set of disputed issues. It is shown that states can cooperate on the issues by limiting military competition, but only as far as a “war constraint” allows. Factors determining the tightness of the war constraint imply hypotheses about the international determinants of military eort and thus the costs of anarchy.

OxPo Workshop on European and Global History

3 pm - Jenny Andersson (Centre d’études européennes at Sciences Po)
'The Futurists. Futurology and the Neoliberal Imagination'.
Discussant: David Priestland (Oxford)

4.15 pm - Paul Lenormand (Centre d'Histoire, Sciences Po)
'A Multinational Exile: Recruiting 'Czechoslovaks' in the Soviet Union during World War II'
Discussant: Robert Gildea (Oxford)

5.30 pm - Gaetano di Tommaso (Centre d'Histoire, Sciences Po)
'Energy Security and National Interest in Early Twentieth-Century America: At the Origins of Washington's Fixation with Foreign Oil'.
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