Agnieszka Swiejkowska

I joined DPIR in October 2024 after eight years in a Research Facilitator role in Oxford Sociology Department. Previously, I worked in the MRC-funded Brain Dynamics Unit in Oxford Pharmacology Department. My background is in social psychology but my interests include many other areas within social sciences.

Responsibilities:

Nayantara Ranganatha

Nayantara is a first-year MPhil Comparative Government student and a member of St Anne's College. Her research interests include political behaviour, authoritarian politics, democratization, legacies of violence, and transitional justice.

Before moving to Oxford, Nayantara graduated with a BSc in Political Science (cum laude) from the University of Amsterdam. Her bachelor's thesis focused on preferences for 'thin' and 'thick' populism as drivers of vote choice in the Netherlands.

Severin Dauer

I am a second-year student in the MPhil in International Relations and a member of St. Anne´s College. Having an interdisciplinary background in economics, politics, finance and philosophy, my research interests are broad, yet geared towards European integration, identity politics, Middle Eastern affairs and CFSP. Outside of my studies, I am involved in several transdisciplinary societies, also serving as President of the Europeanist Society Oxford.

Adam Sharon

I am a first-year student in the MPhil in International Relations program and a member of Somerville College. My research focuses primarily on deterrence in conflicts involving states and violent non-state actors, particularly in the context of Israel and the broader Middle East. I am also deeply interested in the evolution of Israeli strategic thinking following 7 October, and in the challenges US-Israel relations pose to traditional scholarship in International Relations.

Science

Strategic Vote Splitting in Elections

We study vote splitting in elections. Vote splitting refers to the phenomenon that the participation of candidates with little chances of winning has the effect of splitting votes away from more popular candidates. We develop a model of an electoral game with two parties, each consisting of one strong candidate and some weak candidates. We analyze strong candidates' incentives to give side transfers to weak candidates to manipulate their campaign participation decisions. We then derive the winning probabilities of the strong candidates in equilibrium.
Subscribe to