Individual Preferences and Distributive Politics
Valentino Larcinese, LSE, James M. Snyder Jr, MIT, and Cecilia Testa, Royal Holloway
Chair: Johannes Lindvall, University of Oxford
Discussant: James Alt, Harvard
International Political Economy of Redistribution
Lucie Cerna, University of Oxford
Chair: Pablo Beramendi, Duke University
Discussant: Johannes Lindvall, University of Oxford, and Philip Rehm, University of Oxford
Efficiency, Redistribution and Reform
Mark Wickham-Jones, University of Bristol
Chair: David Rueda, University of Oxford
Discussant: Jonas Pontusson, Princeton University
Experimental Approaches to Inequality
Benjamin Barber, Pablo Beramendi, Duke University, and Erik Wibbels, Duke University,
Discussant: Meredith Rolfe, University of OxfordThe Politics of Inequality
Ronald Rogowski, UCLA
Chair: Nancy Bermeo, Department of Politics and International Relations and Nuffield College, Oxford
Discussant: Thomas Plmper, University of Essex
Review Article: Citizens, Presidents and Assemblies: The Study of Semi-Presidentialism beyond Duverger and Linz
Media and Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe
Constitutional power and competing risks: Monarchs, presidents, prime ministers, and the termination of East and West European cabinets
Some European constitutions give cabinets great discretion to manage their own demise, whereas others limit their choices and insert the head of state into decisions about government termination. In this article, we map the tremendous variation in the constitutional rules that govern cabinet termination and test existing expectations about its effects on a government's survival and mode of termination. In doing so, we use the most extensive government survival data set available to date, the first to include East and West European governments.
Party government in Europe? Parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies compared
- Read more about Party government in Europe? Parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies compared
Control over government portfolios is the key to power over policy and patronage, and it is commonly understood to lie with parties in European democracies. However, since the democratic transitions of the 1990s, Europe has had nearly equal numbers of parliamentary and semi-presidential regimes, and there is evidence that the ability of parties to control government posts in these two regime types differs. As yet, political scientists have a limited understanding of the scale and causes of these differences. In this article a principal-agent theoretical explanation is proposed.
Virtue out of necessity? Compliance, commitment, and the improvement of labor conditions in global supply chains
Private, voluntary compliance programs, promoted by global corporations and nongovernmental organizations alike, have produced only modest and uneven improvements in working conditions and labor rights in most global supply chains.