As both commander in chief and holder of the highest elected office in the United States, presidents must inevitably balance competing objectives of the national interest and political survival when assessing alternative military strategies in war. Yet while we all have some intuitive sense that elections “matter” in some way, exactly how, why or when they do so is not well understood. This talk will explore the ways in which electoral pressures push and pull presidents away from courses action they otherwise deem strategically optimal during an ongoing war.

Sally Walker spent 25 years in the national security community, laterally as Director Cyber at GCHQ. She had joint responsibility for running the National Offensive Cyber Programme and led the stand up and design of the National Cyber Force.
Since leaving government, Sally advises at board level on decision making in big data environments, and supports boards in leadership development. She retains an interest in the role of cyber capability in conflict, particularly as it affects the civilian population and governmental attitude to risk.

When major powers clash, or grow more competitive, the historical record shows that small states are the first to be buffeted by the actions of their larger counterparts. Small states do not set the international agenda. This means that if the fears of a breakdown of the rules-based order are well-founded, it will have profound implications for their security. Thus, these actors must look within their own armoury – at the tactics and strategies available to them, within certain bounds – and consider how much leverage they can exert within the context in which they operate.

Grand strategy is back en vogue. Policy makers and scholars alike insist that grand strategy is important, and that states need to have one to meet the challenges of the 21st century. Yet defining precisely what it is – or what it entails - has proven extremely difficult. Numerous academics have spilt much ink trying to pin down a usable definition for grand strategy, however we appear no closer to a consensus than we are to a clear definition of ‘strategy’ itself.

Discussion of Russian notions of future warfare tend, for understandable reasons, to focus on the debates within the military, which are then embodied in doctrine, tactics and procurement decisions. These debates are important, but also much more accessible, given the degree to which they are played out and arbitrated within the military press. However, there is an intertwined, if much less accessible debate within the civilian national security establishment – notably the intelligence services and the Security Council secretariat – which is at least of equal importance.

This talk will consider issues surrounding the UK’s ‘Indo-Pacific Tilt’ as set out in the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy. Namely, why the ‘Indo-Pacific Tilt’ is required, what are its aims, where it is occurring and what form it has taken to date. The extent to which international law is relevant to the ‘Indo-Pacific Tilt’ will also be addressed as well as the principal geopolitical issues that arise. Finally, the likely challenges in delivering the ‘Indo-Pacific Tilt’ will also be considered.

Since its founding in 1927, the PLA has transformed from a foot-soldier heavy and poorly equipped military into a modern military with growing regional power and developing global reach. However, despite its ability to assert Chinese power within the Indo-Pacific region and protect Chinese interests, the PLA’s road to modernisation is not complete. Beyond the ‘heavy metal’ achievements made in the past decade, other elements of the PLA’s development towards becoming a ‘world-class military’ that is capable of ‘fighting and winning wars’ are still a work in progress.

This winter, Russia massed more than 100,000 troops along Ukraine’s borders, sparking fears of a wider war with repercussions for the entire European continent. A ground invasion of Ukraine is a war that Russia would likely win — but at a very high cost in blood and treasure.

Based on over a hundred interviews and on secret records of White House–Kremlin contacts, Not One Inch shows how the United States successfully overcame Russian resistance in the 1990s to expand NATO to more than 900 million people. But it also reveals how Washington’s hardball tactics transformed the era between the Cold War and the present day, undermining what could have become a lasting partnership.

In the early nineteenth century, at height of the Napoleonic Wars, Britain twice inflicted preventive violence on a small and ostensibly neutral European state, Denmark. On the first occasion, in 1801, it did so to break up the League of Armed Neutrality. On the second occasion, in 1807, Britain sought to pre-empt the possible seizure of the Danish fleet by Napoleon. Both operations were controversial at home and abroad, especially the latter, which involved the destruction of parts of the city of Copenhagen and considerable loss of civilian life.