Costs of War – Impact, Meaning and Perceptions, OXPO Conference

This one-day conference explores how the costs of war have been defined by policymakers, combatants, and societies, as well as by scholars and commentators. The papers will reflect comparatively on definitions of cost, as well as examining the impact, meaning and perception of costs in human, social, political, financial, economic, environmental, technological, moral and symbolic terms.

Programme:

9.00 - Welcome: Guillaume Piketty and Peter H. Wilson
9.15 - Session 1 |Chair: Guillaume Piketty

Oil Wealth and Armed Conflict in Colombia

The main objective of this paper is to provide localized evidence about the mechanisms that may link oil wealth with the use of armed force against civilians by non-state armed groups in Colombia. Violence is studied in all three of the standard dimensions: onset, duration and intensity. This paper reports evidence on a subnational variant of a mechanism termed by the literature state-as-target.

Oxford Spring School in Advanced Research Methods 2018

The Oxford Spring School is a week-long course organized by the Department of Politics and International Relations in the University of Oxford. It offers graduate students and researchers from universities across the UK and aboard a unique venue to learn cutting-edge methods in Political Science. The Programme consists of a variety of advanced courses, which place the different qualitative and quantitative data analysis techniques within broader disciplinary trends towards mixed-methods research designs.

Rethinking the Peace Negotiations in Colombia

At the ‘conversation style’ event, “Rethinking the Peace Negotiations in Colombia”, we will take stock of the major challenges and opportunities in the context of the peace talks with the FARC, reflect on the current situation of the peace deal implementation, and consider the way forward in light of the elections. The event will be co-hosted by CCW’s "From Conflict Actors to Architects of Peace" (CONPEACE) programme and the Blavatnik School of Government.

Accountability from Within: Politically Insulated Bureaucrats and Incumbent Rent-Seeking

A growing literature shows that elections are a poor mechanism to hold corrupt incumbents accountable. In that context, can institutional checks and balances compensate for the shortcomings of elections in fighting corruption? This paper examines a possible source of institutional accountability: the presence of politically insulated civil servants with oversight authority over the actions of incumbents. I examine the effect of politically insulated bureaucrats on a type of incumbent rent-seeking: the use of political budget cycles.
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