The SARS-Covid pandemic has led governments in all countries to introduce an array of regulations. We take advantage of Russia’s diverse regional responses to the Covid crises to study the demand for regulation. Following Aghion et al. (2010), we expect that in more civic environments individuals expect others to consider the externalities of their behavior and therefore demand less regulation. We test the argument by drawing on a novel online survey of more than 23,000 respondents in 61 Russian regions.

In sovereign bond markets, investors and credit ratings agencies are attentive to political events and institutions. Their assessments of default risk and creditworthiness hinge, in part, on elections: when elections generate uncertainty for investors, they can lead to increases in volatility and risk premiums. While political economists have analyzed election-related dynamics on the supply (creditor) side, they have paid scant attention to the demand (debtor government) side.

Backsliding examines the processes through which elected rulers weaken checks on executive power, curtail civil and political liberties, and undermine the integrity of the electoral system. Drawing on detailed studies of 16 cases of backsliding, including the United States and countries in Latin America, Eastern Europe, and Africa, we focus on three interrelated causal mechanisms: the pernicious effects of polarization; the ruler’s control of the legislature; and the incremental abuses of power that divides oppositions and keeps them off balance.

Mobilizing support through an organization known as the Farmers' Alliance, the Populist movement of the late 19th century sought to bring together producers throughout the agrarian periphery in an effort to remedy abuses associated with the marketing of commercial crops. Combining innovations in network analysis with new data on the location of market infrastructure and social movement organizations, I examine the relationship between market position and the propensity for Alliance activity.

Although they figure prominently in the economies of the rich democracies, consumers have received strikingly little attention in the comparative political economy literature. Among its rich peers, the United States stands out as the quintessential consumer society. Those studies that address America’s distinctively consumption-oriented political economy mostly attribute this outcome to the actions of the government in the 1930s to stimulate home ownership (and associated mortgage debt) in response to the Great Depression.

Despite a large comparative literature on party machines in distributive politics, scholars have yet to systematically examine how party leaders select local brokers to staff their party organizations. We provide a theoretical framework for studying these selection decisions. We argue that patrons must balance two key concerns: a broker’s efficacy among clients and their loyalty to party and patron. We test the relative importance of these concerns through a conjoint experiment conducted with 343 local political patrons across two Indian cities.