As both commander in chief and holder of the highest elected office in the United States, presidents must inevitably balance competing objectives of the national interest and political survival when assessing alternative military strategies in war. Yet while we all have some intuitive sense that elections “matter” in some way, exactly how, why or when they do so is not well understood. This talk will explore the ways in which electoral pressures push and pull presidents away from courses action they otherwise deem strategically optimal during an ongoing war.

Sally Walker spent 25 years in the national security community, laterally as Director Cyber at GCHQ. She had joint responsibility for running the National Offensive Cyber Programme and led the stand up and design of the National Cyber Force.
Since leaving government, Sally advises at board level on decision making in big data environments, and supports boards in leadership development. She retains an interest in the role of cyber capability in conflict, particularly as it affects the civilian population and governmental attitude to risk.

When major powers clash, or grow more competitive, the historical record shows that small states are the first to be buffeted by the actions of their larger counterparts. Small states do not set the international agenda. This means that if the fears of a breakdown of the rules-based order are well-founded, it will have profound implications for their security. Thus, these actors must look within their own armoury – at the tactics and strategies available to them, within certain bounds – and consider how much leverage they can exert within the context in which they operate.

Grand strategy is back en vogue. Policy makers and scholars alike insist that grand strategy is important, and that states need to have one to meet the challenges of the 21st century. Yet defining precisely what it is – or what it entails - has proven extremely difficult. Numerous academics have spilt much ink trying to pin down a usable definition for grand strategy, however we appear no closer to a consensus than we are to a clear definition of ‘strategy’ itself.

Discussion of Russian notions of future warfare tend, for understandable reasons, to focus on the debates within the military, which are then embodied in doctrine, tactics and procurement decisions. These debates are important, but also much more accessible, given the degree to which they are played out and arbitrated within the military press. However, there is an intertwined, if much less accessible debate within the civilian national security establishment – notably the intelligence services and the Security Council secretariat – which is at least of equal importance.