When the Islamic empire emerged in the seventh century, it faced a twofold challenge: socializing its population to commit to a unified state that curtailed previous freedoms while subjecting itself to the requirement to adhere to the teachings of the religion through which it legitimized itself. In this presentation, I argue that this dual challenge crystallized in a debate about the rule of law that emerged as early as the first generation of Islam. The debate produced a distinctly constitutional political theory that came to structure classical Islamic law.

Join us for a day of presentations exploring the works of Tayeb Salih. The day is divided into 3 sessions: (1) The World of Tayeb Salih; (2) Tayeb Salih in the World; and (3) Reading Tayeb Salih's Non-fiction. Programme timings are available at https://www.sudaneseprogramme.org/
Please join us for all or part of the day, all are welcome. Registration is essential:
In-person attendance: Please email Dr Ahmed Al-Shahi: namlas159@gmail.com
Online attendance: Please register your details at https://tinyurl.com/TSP26May

We exhibit a voting method for elections that is resistant to strategic voting and elects the majority winner (i.e., the Condorcet winner) when voters’ preferences over candidates are single-peaked, meaning that a voter prefers candidates closer to her in ideology to those further away. Moreover, we show that this system is essentially the unique strategy-resistant method among all voting systems satisfying anonymity (equal treatment of voters) and neutrality (equal treatment of candidates) for single-peaked preferences.