Chair: Othon Anastasakis (St Antony's College, Oxford)
Decisions on women’s claims for international protection from domestic violence, including Lazo-Majano (1987), Islam and Shah (1999) and Refugee Appeal No. 76044 (2008) have generated strands of case law which both contradict each other and the Refugee Convention’s object and purpose. Adjudicators have delineated overly restrictive social groups and ignored, identified, or imputed a range of political opinions. A disproportionate focus on ‘private’ motives has also obscured the nexus between persecution and the Convention ground(s). Similarly, issues left unresolved by the ECtHR in Opuz (2009) have resulted in the European Convention on Human Rights’ prohibition of discrimination being applied inconsistently, and recently, not at all, in cases involving domestic violence.
This talk analyses this jurisprudence, focusing on two cases currently before the Court of Justice of the European Union: WS [2023] and K, L [2023]. It provides an improved understanding of domestic violence that could be relied on to ground principled decision making on discrimination, persecution, and the Convention reasons.
This talk analyses this jurisprudence, focusing on two cases currently before the Court of Justice of the European Union: WS [2023] and K, L [2023]. It provides an improved understanding of domestic violence that could be relied on to ground principled decision making on discrimination, persecution, and the Convention reasons.